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From wallet to chain

A bridge of two worlds on an Ethereum transaction

Michał Zając
Nethermind

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How Ethereum can accommodate institutional clients?

Accountability
Who is responsible for adding blocks to the chain?
Who is responsible for censoring transactions?

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How finality of blocks is reached and how robust Ethereum finality is?

Auditability
How traceable are Ethereum transactions?
Can we combine transaction privacy with auditability?

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Ethereum transaction lifecycle – an overview

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

block **added** to blockchain



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Accountability

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In the mempool



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

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

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

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

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

What is the power of a person who decides what and in what order ends up in a block?

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In the mempool - Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)

Frontrunning: putting a transaction **before** the user's transaction

Sender: 0x234aae…
Recipient: 0x108eead4…
Amount 3ETH
Buy NFT
Fee: 120 gwei

In the mempool - Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)

Frontrunning: putting a transaction **before** the user's transaction

Sender: 0x234aae…
Recipient: 0x108eead4…
Amount 3ETH
Buy NFT
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Sender: 0x0934aad…
Recipient: 0x108eead4…
Amount 3ETH
Buy NFT
Fee: 140 gwei

"Same" transactions - one pays more fees
Guess which will be included first?

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

In the mempool - Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)

Backrunning: putting a transaction **after** the user's transaction

Exchange 1: ETHUSDC = 2500
Exchange 2: ETHUSDC = 2500

Sender: 0x7743d342e…
Recipient: 0x8443a108aab34…
Sell 1ETH to USDC on Exchange 1
Fee: 100 gwei

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

Exchange 1: ETHUSDC = 2499
Exchange 2: ETHUSDC = 2500

Sender: 0x7743d342e…
Recipient: 0x8443a108aab34…
Sell 1ETH to USDC on Exchange 1
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

Exchange 1: ETHUSDC = 2499
Exchange 2: ETHUSDC = 2500

Sender: 0x0934aad…
Recipient: 0x108eead4…
Sell 2499USDC for 1ETH on Exchange 1
Buy 1ETH for 2500USDC on Exchange 2
Fee: 100 gwei

In the mempool - Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)

Sandwiching: putting transactions **before** and **after** the user's transaction



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



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

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

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Sandwiching. In a block

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

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



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



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

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Private orderflow for mitigating MEV

Public mempool

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Private mempool

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Whose private mempool it is?

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Private orderflow. Builders



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

Build blocks for proposers

Specialized entities that make blocks as profitable as possible

Handful of actors (vs 1’000’000 of validators)

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Proposer-builder separation



1. Builders compete with each other.
2. Relays are trusted by both the proposer and builders
3. Builders try to build the most profitable block
4. They compete in an auction. The bids are collected by the relay.
5. The highest bid wins.
6. The relayer sends the block header to the proposer, who signs it
7. The relayer reveals the block to the proposer who propagates it

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Accountability in PBS

Collaborating with compliant builders
Institutions can collaborate with selected builders who follow particular AML, KYC practices, so institutional transactions are not processed with transactions of unknown origin

Censorship and delays
Institutions can have SLA-s with builders that specify how their transactions should be processed.
If something goes wrong, institutions know who is responsible for the issue.

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Integrity

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Ethereum finality

“51% attack”	Malicious majority of nodes re-write the history and efficiently fork the chain
Forking	Bug in a node software or network issues make the chain split
Finality delay	Malicious users might be incentivized to delay finality to achieve financial gains



NETHERMIND

Proof of stake

Slots
Place for a block
New slot every **12s**

Epoch
32 slots
(12.8 minutes)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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NETHERMIND

Economic finality brings blockchain integrity



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

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- ⅓ * 1’000’000 * 32 ETH > 10.5M ETH > $26B

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

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

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Social consensus may decide to abandon malicious fork

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Auditability

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Auditability with privacy



Everything is in the blocks

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

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

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Zero-knowledge technology allows institutions to trade privately without revealing the transaction sender, recipient, amount or asset type

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

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zcash

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

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

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Zero-knowledge allows to privately check
- That the transaction was compliant with a set of predefined rules
- That none of the transaction parties were blacklisted

It is also possible to de-anonymize and audit trades when a party is audited.

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Between public and private chains

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Scaling Ethereum throughput - Rollups

Subchains which inherit security from Ethereum



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

Starknet



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

Public-permissioned chains – a middleground



Rollups allow institutions to

- Maintain **access to the assets** traded and stored on Ethereum
- **Control who they are trading with** with great granularity: e.g. only KYCed, AML-compliant parties could be allowed to the rollup

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Key takeaways

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- Institutions can ensure accountability and compliance of block production by utilizing **Proposer-Builder Separation** tools
- Integrity of Ethereum transactions is protected by its proof of stake mechanism that makes **forking finalized blocks economically infeasible**
- **Auditability** of transactions can be achieved along with **transaction privacy** thanks to the zero-knowledge technology.
- **Bespoke institutional rollups** allow institutions to maintain better control over their public blockchain activity and still benefit from **network effects**.

NETHERMIND

Whitepaper

From Wallet to Chain.
A Bridge of Two Worlds on an Ethereum Transaction

Nethermind & Deutsche Bank

May 2025

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Deutsche Bank

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thank you